Somalia's Al-Shabaab fight shifts to bilateral troop deals, analyst says
- Somali forces with AU and partner support retook Mubarak and Daarusalaam in Lower Shabelle in March 2026.
- Uganda and Ethiopia are reported to have thousands of troops in Somalia outside the AU mission.
- An analyst says battlefield gains will only last if Somali forces and local administration can hold territory.
Somalia's campaign against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia is increasingly being fought through bilateral troop arrangements alongside the African Union mission, according to an analysis by a retired military officer.
The piece, by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Freddie Grounds, appeared in BusinessDay and Leadership on Monday. It looks at how Somali-led ground operations, foreign troop deployments and outside air power are fitting together in 2026.
In March 2026, Somali National Army forces, backed by AUSSOM's Ugandan contingent and international partners, announced the recapture of Mubarak and Daarusalaam in Lower Shabelle. AUSSOM is the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia.
Further operations in April targeted more insurgent positions, with AUSSOM reporting air cover and coordinated ground action.
Who is fighting, and how
The United States has kept up a heavy air campaign. On 17 October, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed a strike targeting Al-Shabaab near Dhooble Airport in southern Somalia. AFRICOM's published register listed 88 strikes in Somalia in 2026 at the time of writing, against both Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
Türkiye has widened its military ties with Somalia through training, defence cooperation and the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft, shown publicly in April 2026.
The analysis notes that neither US nor Turkish air power has been shown to have directly supported the specific Lower Shabelle operations.
Alongside the AU mission, national deployments are growing. Citing The EastAfrican, the analysis says Uganda is assessed to have between 4,000 and 6,000 troops in Somalia under bilateral arrangements, on top of its AUSSOM contingent of about 4,500. Ethiopia is reported to have around 5,000 bilateral troops, alongside its 2,500-person AU allocation. The figures are estimates, not independently verified totals.
The difference matters, the analysis says. AUSSOM works through a multilateral framework, while bilateral deployments run through national arrangements with the Somali government. Their command structures and priorities are not necessarily the same.
Photographs reported by The EastAfrican after the Lower Shabelle operations showed Somali and Ugandan troops beside personnel from Bancroft Global Development, a contractor that trains and mentors Somali forces. The analysis says this shows how close specialist support sits to the frontline, but does not establish a combat role.
The risk behind the gains
Bilateral forces can add manpower, and air support can break up insurgent positions and open the way for ground advances. Intelligence, training and logistics can sharpen operations further.
But the analysis warns that tactical wins do not prove a joint command exists, nor that airstrikes caused particular ground successes. Relying on foreign troops and air power may win battles without securing lasting peace.
Holding recaptured territory, it says, needs secure supply routes, capable Somali forces, working local administration and public confidence, or insurgents will return.
The future of AUSSOM remains central. The analysis says its authorised strength should not be confused with the number of troops actually deployed. Egypt's participation was being prepared as far back as February 2026, and any expansion should be judged on confirmed decisions rather than reported proposals.
The real question, it concludes, is how bilateral deployments can reinforce a Somali-led security strategy rather than replace multilateral cooperation. The test is whether outside support builds lasting Somali security capacity instead of long-term dependence.
